LEBANON

DEEPENING FOOD CRISIS DRIVEN BY CONFLICT ESCALATION

IPC ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY UPDATED PROJECTION ANALYSIS
APRIL - AUGUST 2026
Published on 29 April 2026

Overview

Lebanon has experienced a sharp deterioration in the food security situation following the drastic escalation in hostilities and widespread displacement that began in early March 2026. Around 1.24 million people are facing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) between April and August 2026, a substantial increase compared with the 874,000 people who faced Crisis or worse between November 2025 and March 2026. The worsening food security situation is experienced among all population groups—residents, refugees, and Internally displaced persons (IDPs)—and reverses any improvements observed in the previous reporting period.

The decline is primarily driven by renewed conflict and large-scale displacement, disruption to livelihoods and income opportunities, localised market disruption in conflict-affected areas, rising food and fuel prices, and an expected reduction in humanitarian food assistance coverage—particularly from May 2026 onwards. More than one million people were displaced as of late March 2026, with figures expected to remain high throughout the projection period. While markets remain functional and food is available at the national level, severe localised disruptions persist in the southern governorates and other conflict-affected areas.

Beyond the direct impact of the escalation in Lebanon, the ongoing conflict in the Middle East is expected to place further pressure on fuel and transport costs, import prices, remittance inflows, fertiliser and agricultural input costs, and overall market confidence, with spillover effects on household purchasing power and economic access to food across the country. This is particularly critical in the Lebanese context, where the main constraint is affordability rather than food availability. Disruptions to regional trade routes and rising oil prices are likely to materialise over the coming months through higher inflationary pressure, increased operational costs, and reduced income opportunities. Should regional tensions persist, hostilities intensify, or displacement remain protracted, food security outcomes are likely to deteriorate further beyond the levels currently projected. Close monitoring of key risk factors, including conflict dynamics, displacement, regional trade and fuel supply disruptions, Humanitarian Food Security Assistance (HFSA), and market functionality, will therefore be critical throughout the projection period.

This IPC acute food insecurity updated projection analysis covers four population groups: Lebanese residents, Syrian refugees displaced before December 2024, Palestine refugees, and post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria following the transition of administration in December

UPDATED PROJECTED PERIOD: APRIL - AUGUST 2026 (Lebanese residents, Syrian refugees, Palestine refugees and post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria)

	Phase	People
1.24 M **24 percent of the population analysed** People facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION	Phase 5	0 People in Catastrophe
	Phase 4	101,000 People in Emergency
	Phase 3	1,141,000 People in Crisis
	Phase 2	1,865,000 People in Stressed
	Phase 1	2,085,000 People in Food Security

Updated Projected Acute Food Insecurity: April - August 2026



***DISCLAIMER:** This projection update was undertaken in response to significant changes in the most likely scenario defined in the acute food insecurity (AFI) analysis conducted in October 2025, including shifts in conflict intensity, displacement, regional conflict, closure of trade routes and rising prices. As a result, an update of the AFI analysis was deemed necessary. The IPC Technical Working Group (TWG) conducted this projection update based on the most recent information available at the time of analysis, which was concluded on 3 April 2026. The TWG acknowledges the evolving and uncertain context and has based their analysis on the latest available data. Should the situation change substantially from the updated most likely scenario, they recognise the need for a further update to ensure the continued provision of timely and relevant information to inform food security analysis in Lebanon.*

2024. Of the total projected number of people in Phase 3 or above, 725,000 are Lebanese residents (19 percent of the analysed Lebanese population), 362,000 are Syrian refugees (36 percent of the analysed Syrian refugee population), 104,000 are Palestine refugees (45 percent of the analysed Palestine refugee population), and around 50,000 are post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria (52 percent of the post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria population). This indicates that, while the deterioration is increasingly affecting Lebanese households at scale, refugee and newly displaced populations continue to face the highest severity in relative terms.

The biggest increases in populations in Phase 3 or above are found in the southern governorates, particularly in Bent Jbeil, Marjaayoun, El Nabatieh and Sour districts, among both Lebanese and Syrian refugee populations. In these areas, high levels of acute food insecurity are affecting 55 to 65 percent of the population, including approximately 10 percent of people who are in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency). This is largely attributable to market disruptions impacting availability and access to essential food items, in addition to the hindered humanitarian access, the impact on civilian infrastructure, and limited livelihood opportunities.

The deterioration in the food security situation is compounded by a widening humanitarian assistance gap. While assistance coverage increased immediately following the onset of the escalation, assumptions indicate a sharp decline in coverage across all population groups beyond May 2026, linked to funding constraints and an uncertain humanitarian financing outlook. HFSA coverage throughout the April-August 2026 period is projected at 23 percent for all Lebanese residents—slightly higher than the 20 percent in the previous analysis period (November 2025-March 2026)—while for Syrian refugees it stands at 37 percent, one percentage point higher than the current period. This gap in assistance is expected to significantly increase the risk of households in IPC Phase 2 (Stressed) deteriorating into IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) during the projection period. At the same time, humanitarian access to conflict-affected areas remains severely constrained due to insecurity, movement restrictions, and infrastructure damage, particularly in the south and Nabatieh, further limiting the effective delivery of assistance where needs are highest.

KEY DRIVERS

The projection update is based on a revised assumptions framework that reflects the renewed escalation in hostilities that began in early March 2026, replacing the previous assumption of relative stability and gradual recovery that underpinned the October 2025 analysis. The updated scenario assumes continued elevated conflict intensity throughout the projection period, with hostilities expected to persist across southern Lebanon, parts of the Bekaa, and the southern suburbs of Beirut, alongside the risk of further geographic expansion.

Hostilities: The primary driver of the significant deterioration is the renewed conflict escalation. Over 2,100 people were killed and more than 7,000 wounded since the escalation of the conflict between in early March and mid-April 2026. The most affected areas include the South and El Nabatieh governorates, as well as the southern suburbs of Beirut.

Displacement: Nearly 1.1 million people (almost a fifth of Lebanon's population) are now displaced, with figures expected to remain high and potentially increase further during the projection period. Continued insecurity is expected to constrain household mobility, reduce access to livelihoods and markets, disrupt humanitarian access, and increase pressure on host communities and services.

High food and fuel prices: Rising costs are expected to further weaken household access to food and other essential needs. In March 2026 alone, the food Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket (SMEB) increased by six percent, while fuel prices rose sharply following both domestic fiscal measures prior to the escalation and the broader regional conflict (41 percent for gasoline, 83 percent for diesel and 27 percent for cooking gas between mid-February and mid-April 2026). These increases are expected to continue feeding into higher costs of transportation, food and non-food commodities, cooking gas, and essential services, thereby further eroding household purchasing power.

Market functionality and agricultural disruption: Although markets are expected to remain broadly supplied at national level, severe localised disruptions are likely to persist in conflict-affected areas, particularly in the South and El Nabatieh, where market functionality has sharply deteriorated. At the same time, the agricultural outlook has worsened, with conflict-related damage, reduced access to land, higher input and fertiliser costs, with the cost of nitrogen-based fertiliser having increased substantially, such as the cost of Urea fertiliser increasing by 50 percent by mid-April 2026, and disruption during critical harvesting periods expected to further undermine rural livelihoods and domestic fresh food supply.

Economic shocks: The economic outlook has worsened significantly compared with the previous round of analysis. Earlier expectations of recovery have been replaced by an expected Gross Domestic Product (GDP) contraction in 2026, reversing earlier projections of up to four percent growth, and driven by lower tourism activity, disruptions in trade and services, reduced remittance inflows, and continued uncertainty. Income opportunities are expected to decline, particularly for households dependent on informal labour, tourism, agriculture, retail, and daily wage employment.

2026 CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND EXTERNAL SPILLOVER RISKS

The 2026 conflict in the Middle East poses a significant risk to Lebanon's food security outlook during the projection period. While the updated projection analysis assumes that national food supply remains broadly adequate and that no immediate nationwide shortages materialise, the primary constraint is economic access to food, driven by rising fuel, transport, and import costs, alongside localised physical access constraints in conflict-affected areas. Disruptions to regional trade are increasing the cost of imported food, non-food supplies and agricultural inputs constraining economic dynamism and domestic food production. Tourism and remittances inflow which are an important revenue for Lebanon, are also heavily affected.

Between mid-February and mid-April 2026—prior to the escalation in Lebanon and the broader regional conflict—the cost of diesel increased by 83 percent, gasoline by 41 percent, and cooking gas by 27 percent. These increases are already exerting significant upward pressure on the cost of transportation, retail operations, generators, agricultural production, irrigation, food distribution, and household energy expenditures. Given Lebanon's heavy dependence on imported fuel and the pass-through effects on the prices of essential goods and services, these increases are expected to continue weakening household purchasing power in the coming months.

The impact is also expected to extend to domestic food production and agricultural livelihoods. Higher diesel and transport costs directly increase the cost of irrigation, land preparation, harvesting, cold storage, and the movement of agricultural produce to markets. In addition, the 2026 conflict in the Middle East and disruptions to trade routes are likely to place further pressure on the cost of fertilisers, pesticides, seeds, and other imported agricultural inputs, further constraining local production and increasing the cost of domestically produced fresh food items, particularly vegetables and fruits. The cost of nitrogen-based fertilisers has increased substantially since the beginning of the crisis, with the cost of Urea, for example, increasing by more than 50 percent by mid-April 2026. This is having global effects on the cost of production of essential agriculture products, and ultimately on the cost of essential goods, many of which are imported into Lebanon. This also comes on top of already severe losses in conflict-affected agricultural areas and could further weaken rural livelihoods and domestic market supply.

Any prolonged disruption to the Strait of Hormuz trade corridor—which remains the most critical global maritime chokepoints for oil, gas, global fertiliser supply, and broader regional trade flows—is likely to further increase fuel import costs, insurance and shipping premiums, and the price of imported commodities reaching Lebanon, even where physical food availability remains adequate. While no national shortage of essential food commodities is currently anticipated, the main risk remains affordability rather than physical food availability, with higher logistics and import costs expected to translate into higher food and non-food prices across the country.

Additional spillover effects are expected on a macroeconomic scale. The 2026 conflict in the Middle East is likely to affect tourism flows, regional commercial activity, and remittance inflows, which remain a critical source of income for Lebanese households. Remittances from Gulf countries account for approximately 48 percent of total remittance inflows to Lebanon, and any slowdown in Gulf economies or disruptions linked to the regional conflict could significantly affect household purchasing power and private consumption. Given the recency of the escalation, the full impact of both the conflict in Lebanon and the wider regional conflict may not yet be fully reflected in the current analysis, and effects are expected to unfold progressively over time.

POPULATION

For this projection update, the IPC Technical Working Group (TWG) endorsed the use of the Lebanon Response Plan (LRP) 2026 population figures as the baseline, to ensure full consistency with inter-agency planning and response frameworks. The analysis covers four population groups: Lebanese residents, Syrian refugees displaced before December 2024, Palestine refugees, and post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria. Overall, the analysis covers approximately 99 percent of the total population living in Lebanon, corresponding to an analysed population of 5.19 million people.

The baseline population figures used for this round are as follows: 3.864 million Lebanese residents,[1] 1 million Syrian refugees, 232,000 Palestine refugees, and 96,000 post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria, the latter representing the analysed caseload across the three units of analysis (in Akkar, Baalbek-El Hermel, and Tripoli) included for this group.

Lebanese IDPs have been integrated at district of arrival. District-level population figures for Lebanese residents (this category includes newly displaced IDPs) and Syrian refugees were updated using the latest IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) data (round 89), given the rapidly evolving displacement context following the March 2026 conflict escalation. To estimate the population remaining in each district and the number of displaced individuals arriving at host districts, the TWG applied the same nationality proportions observed in the LRP 2026 district-level baseline figures to the updated displacement flows.

For districts heavily affected by the escalation in the south, including El Nabatieh and the Bent Jbeil–Marjaayoun cluster, it was agreed to apply a minimum adjustment threshold of 10 percent of the original population assumed to remain in each district. This approach aims to better reflect large-scale displacement and access constraints, while maintaining a realistic overview of population dynamics and movements in the most affected areas. In addition, for three Syrian refugee units of analysis in the Bekaa governorate, the estimated displaced caseload was further adjusted using WFP redemption analysis data, as the initial displacement estimates were found to be lower than those suggested by other operational data sources.

For Syrian refugees, the IPC TWG retained the updated baseline population figure of one million people, in line with the LRP 2026 and inter-agency planning assumptions. This represents a downward revision compared to earlier IPC rounds, including the November 2024 conflict analysis, where a population figure of approximately 1.5 million Syrian refugees was still being used. This adjustment reflects the latest inter-agency understanding of the in-country Syrian refugee population, taking into account continued cross-border movements, onward departures, return intentions, and updated planning figures, and should be considered when comparing absolute caseloads of people in Phase 3 or above across previous rounds. This revision has a direct impact on absolute numbers of people in Phase 3 or above, even though severity among Syrian refugees remains high (36 percent classified in Phase 3 or above).

For Palestine refugees, the IPC TWG retained the most recent population figures provided by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and aligned these with the latest planning assumptions. For post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria, the analysis covers approximately 96,000 people, representing the caseload present in the three units of analysis of Akkar, Tripoli, and the Baalbek–El Hermel cluster, consistent with the methodology applied in the previous round.

DISCLAIMER: *This report incorporates population figures based on the data endorsed by the Lebanon Response Plan and inter-agency coordination systems and updated figures based on the latest displacement data for Lebanese residents as per the International Organization for Migration (IOM) Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) round 89 report. These figures were utilised in recognition of the inherent challenges in accurately estimating population numbers during this fluid and evolving period. Factors influencing this decision include the lack of reliable baseline population figures, significant cross-border movements between Lebanon and Syria, discrepancies in existing estimates of displacement and population movements, differences in baseline population figures used across coordination frameworks, and limited nationality disaggregation within available displacement datasets, as highlighted above. The IPC TWG acknowledges the provisional nature of these figures and will review them in subsequent IPC rounds as soon as greater clarity and updated data become available. This approach aims to ensure full alignment with ongoing planning and coordination mechanisms in Lebanon, avoiding divergence that could hinder collective response efforts and operational targeting.*

[1] *Lebanese residents include the one million recently displaced IDPs, who have been integrated at district of arrival.*

UPDATED PROJECTION SITUATION MAP AND POPULATION TABLE (APRIL – AUGUST 2026)

LEBANESE RESIDENTS
UPDATED PROJECTED AFI: April - August 2026

725,000
19% of the population analysed

People facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above)

IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION

Phase	
Phase 5	**0** People in Catastrophe
Phase 4	**54,000** People in Emergency
Phase 3	**671,000** People in Crisis
Phase 2	**1,285,000** People in Stressed
Phase 1	**1,854,000** People in Food Security

SYRIAN REFUGEES
UPDATED PROJECTED AFI: April - August 2026

362,000
36% of the population analysed

People facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above)

IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION

Phase	
Phase 5	**0** People in Catastrophe
Phase 4	**26,000** People in Emergency
Phase 3	**337,000** People in Crisis
Phase 2	**462,000** People in Stressed
Phase 1	**175,000** People in Food Security

PALESTINE REFUGEES
UPDATED PROJECTED AFI: April - August 2026

104,000
45% of the population analysed

People facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above)

IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION

Phase	
Phase 5	**0** People in Catastrophe
Phase 4	**12,000** People in Emergency
Phase 3	**93,000** People in Crisis
Phase 2	**81,000** People in Stressed
Phase 1	**46,000** People in Food Security

POST-DECEMBER 2024 ARRIVALS FROM SYRIA
UPDATED PROJECTED AFI: April - August 2026

50,000
52% of the population analysed

People facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above)

IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION

Phase	
Phase 5	**0** People in Catastrophe
Phase 4	**10,000** People in Emergency
Phase 3	**40,000** People in Crisis
Phase 2	**36,000** People in Stressed
Phase 1	**10,000** People in Food Security



POPULATION TABLE FOR THE PROJECTION PERIOD (APRIL - AUGUST 2026)

District	Population	Total population analysed	Phase 1		Phase 2		Phase 3		Phase 4		Phase 5		Area Phase	Phase 3+	
			#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%		#people	%
Akkar	Lebanese	301,977	75,494	25	135,890	45	90,593	30	0	0	0	0	3	90,593	30
	Syrian ref.	145,896	21,884	15	72,948	50	43,769	30	7,295	5	0	0	3	51,064	35
	Post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria	16,661	1,666	10	7,497	45	5,831	35	1,666	10	0	0	3	7,497	45
	Total	**464,534**	**99,044**	**21**	**216,335**	**47**	**140,193**	**30**	**8,961**	**2**	**0**	**0**		**149,154**	**32**
Aley	Lebanese	337,213	168,607	50	101,164	30	67,443	20	0	0	0	0	3	67,443	20
	Syrian ref.	84,561	25,368	30	38,052	45	21,140	25	0	0	0	0	3	21,140	25
	Total	**421,774**	**193,975**	**46**	**139,216**	**33**	**88,583**	**21**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**		**88,583**	**21**
Baabda	Lebanese	252,519	101,008	40	101,008	40	50,504	20	0	0	0	0	3	50,504	20
	Syrian ref.	67,851	13,570	20	30,533	45	23,748	35	0	0	0	0	3	23,748	35
	Total	**320,370**	**114,578**	**36**	**131,541**	**41**	**74,252**	**23**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**		**74,252**	**23**
Baalbek & El Hermel	Baalbek & El Hermel Lebanese	201,361	50,340	25	80,544	40	60,408	30	10,068	5	0	0	3	70,476	35
	Baalbek Syrian ref.	100,726	5,036	5	45,327	45	45,327	45	5,036	5	0	0	3	50,363	50
	El Hermel Syrian ref.	5,959	596	10	2,682	45	2,682	45	0	0	0	0	3	2,682	45
	Baalbek & El Hermel post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria	68,288	6,829	10	23,901	35	30,730	45	6,829	10	0	0	3	37,558	55
	Total	**376,334**	**62,801**	**17**	**152,454**	**41**	**139,147**	**37**	**21,933**	**6**	**0**	**0**		**161,079**	**43**
Bcharre & Zgharta	Bcharre & Zgharta Lebanese	97,194	53,457	55	38,878	40	4,860	5	0	0	0	0	2	4,860	5
	Bcharre Syrian ref.	1,224	367	30	673	55	184	15	0	0	0	0	2	184	15
	Zgharta Syrian ref.	12,528	3,132	25	5,638	45	3,758	30	0	0	0	0	3	3,758	30
	Total	**110,946**	**56,956**	**51**	**45,189**	**41**	**8,802**	**8**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**		**8,802**	**8**
Beirut	Lebanese	451,050	248,078	55	112,763	25	67,658	15	22,553	5	0	0	3	90,210	20
	Syrian ref.	64,929	12,986	20	32,465	50	19,479	30	0	0	0	0	3	19,479	30
	Total	**515,979**	**261,064**	**51**	**145,228**	**28**	**87,137**	**17**	**22,553**	**4**	**0**	**0**		**109,689**	**21**
Bent Jbeil & Marjaayoun	Lebanese	8,360	0	0	2,926	35	4,598	55	836	10	0	0	3	5,434	65
	Syrian ref.	1,272	0	0	445	35	700	55	127	10	0	0	3	827	65
	Total	**9,632**	**0**	**0**	**3,371**	**35**	**5,298**	**55**	**963**	**10**	**0**	**0**		**6,261**	**65**
Chouf & Jezzine	Chouf & Jezzine Lebanese	392,102	196,051	50	117,631	30	78,420	20	0	0	0	0	3	78,420	20
	Chouf Syrian ref.	66,075	16,519	25	29,734	45	19,823	30	0	0	0	0	3	19,823	30
	Jezzine Syrian ref.	3,616	723	20	1,808	50	1,085	30	0	0	0	0	3	1,085	30
	Total	**461,793**	**213,293**	**46**	**149,173**	**32**	**99,328**	**22**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**		**99,328**	**22**

District	Population	Total population analysed	Phase 1		Phase 2		Phase 3		Phase 4		Phase 5		Area Phase	Phase 3+	
			#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%		#people	%
El Batroun & El Koura	El Batroun & El Koura Lebanese	133,876	87,019	65	40,163	30	6,694	5	0	0	0	0	2	6,694	5
	El Batroun Syrian ref.	12,866	2,573	20	7,076	55	3,217	25	0	0	0	0	3	3,217	25
	El Koura Syrian ref.	15,281	3,056	20	7,641	50	4,584	30	0	0	0	0	3	4,584	30
	Total	**162,023**	**92,648**	**57**	**54,880**	**34**	**14,495**	**9**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**		**14,495**	**9**
El Meten	Lebanese	411,865	267,712	65	123,560	30	20,593	5	0	0	0	0	2	20,593	5
	Syrian ref.	55,381	16,614	30	24,921	45	13,845	25	0	0	0	0	3	13,845	25
	Total	**467,246**	**284,326**	**61**	**148,481**	**32**	**34,438**	**7**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**		**34,438**	**7**
El Minieh-Dennie	Lebanese	129,463	51,785	40	45,312	35	32,366	25	0	0	0	0	3	32,366	25
	Syrian ref.	45,102	9,020	20	20,296	45	15,786	35	0	0	0	0	3	15,786	35
	Total	**174,565**	**60,805**	**35**	**65,608**	**38**	**48,152**	**28**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**		**48,152**	**28**
El Nabatieh	Lebanese	20,613	2,061	10	8,245	40	9,276	45	1,031	5	0	0	3	10,307	50
	Syrian ref.	2,731	137	5	956	35	1,366	50	273	10	0	0	3	1,639	60
	Total	**23,344**	**2,198**	**9**	**9,201**	**39**	**10,642**	**46**	**1,304**	**6**	**0**	**0**		**11,946**	**51**
Hasbaya & Rachaya	Hasbaya & Rachaya Lebanese	53,848	24,232	45	18,847	35	8,077	15	2,692	5	0	0	3	10,770	20
	Hasbaya Syrian ref.	3,030	1,061	35	758	25	1,061	35	152	5	0	0	3	1,212	40
	Rachaya Syrian ref.	5,130	513	10	2,822	55	1,539	30	257	5	0	0	3	1,795	35
	Total	**62,008**	**25,806**	**42**	**22,427**	**36**	**10,677**	**17**	**3,101**	**5**	**0**	**0**		**13,777**	**22**
Jbeil & Kesrwane	Jbeil & Kesrwane Lebanese	370,342	240,722	65	111,103	30	18,517	5	0	0	0	0	2	18,517	5
	Jbeil Syrian ref.	13,767	2,753	20	8,260	60	2,753	20	0	0	0	0	3	2,753	20
	Kesrwane Syrian ref.	21,637	6,491	30	10,819	50	4,327	20	0	0	0	0	3	4,327	20
	Total	**405,746**	**249,966**	**62**	**130,182**	**32**	**25,597**	**6**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**		**25,597**	**6**
Saida	Lebanese	261,127	91,394	35	91,394	35	65,282	25	13,056	5	0	0	3	78,338	30
	Syrian ref.	45,577	6,837	15	18,231	40	18,231	40	2,279	5	0	0	3	20,510	45
	Total	**306,704**	**98,231**	**32**	**109,625**	**36**	**83,513**	**27**	**15,335**	**5**	**0**	**0**		**98,848**	**32**
Sour	Lebanese	24,827	1,241	5	9,931	40	12,414	50	1,241	5	0	0	3	13,655	55
	Syrian ref.	7,567	378	5	2,270	30	4,162	55	757	10	0	0	3	4,919	65
	Total	**32,394**	**1,619**	**5**	**12,201**	**38**	**16,576**	**51**	**1,998**	**6**	**0**	**0**		**18,574**	**57**
Tripoli	Lebanese	202,922	101,461	50	71,023	35	30,438	15	0	0	0	0	2	30,438	15
	Syrian ref.	27,663	6,916	25	12,448	45	8,299	30	0	0	0	0	3	8,299	30
	Post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria	10,907	1,091	10	4,908	45	3,817	35	1,091	10	0	0	3	4,908	45
	Total	**241,492**	**109,468**	**45**	**88,379**	**37**	**42,554**	**18**	**1,091**	**0**	**0**	**0**		**43,645**	**18**

District	Population	Total population analysed	Phase 1		Phase 2		Phase 3		Phase 4		Phase 5		Area Phase	Phase 3+	
			#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%		#people	%
West Bekaa	Lebanese	56,983	22,793	40	19,944	35	11,397	20	2,849	5	0	0	3	14,246	25
	Syrian ref.	46,829	4,683	10	21,073	45	18,732	40	2,341	5	0	0	3	21,073	45
	Total	103,812	27,476	26	41,017	40	30,129	29	5,190	5	0	0		35,319	34
Zahle	Lebanese	156,654	70,494	45	54,829	35	31,331	20	0	0	0	0	3	31,331	20
	Syrian ref.	142,801	14,280	10	64,260	45	57,120	40	7,140	5	0	0	3	64,260	45
	Total	299,455	84,774	28	119,089	40	88,451	30	7,140	2	0	0		95,591	32
Palestine ref.	Palestine ref.	231,515	46,303	20	81,030	35	92,606	40	11,576	5	0	0	3	104,182	45
	Total	231,515	46,303	20	81,030	35	92,606	40	11,576	5	0	0		104,182	45
Total	Lebanese	3,864,296	1,853,949	48	1,285,155	33	670,869	18	54,326	1	0	0		725,195	19
	Syrian ref.	1,000,000	175,493	18	462,136	46	336,717	34	25,657	3	0	0		362,374	36
	Post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria	95,856	9,586	10	36,306	38	40,378	42	9,586	10	0	0		49,964	52
	Palestine ref.	231,515	46,303	20	81,030	35	92,606	40	11,576	5	0	0		104,182	45
	Grand Total	5,191,667	2,085,331	40	1,864,627	36	1,140,570	22	101,145	2	0	0		1,241,715	24

Note: A population in Phase 3+ does not necessarily reflect the full population in need of urgent action. This is because some households may be in Phase 2 or even 1 but only because of receipt of assistance, therefore, they may need continued action. Marginal inconsistencies that may arise in the overall percentages of totals and grand totals are attributable to rounding.

UPDATED PROJECTION SITUATION OVERVIEW (APRIL - AUGUST 2026)

The rapid escalation of hostilities in Lebanon has significantly worsened the food security situation. Around 1.24 million people (24 percent of the analysed population) are facing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above, Crisis or worse) between April and August 2026, marking a staggering 30 percent increase from the 961,000 people initially projected to be in IPC Phase 3 or above in the same period in the previous analysis conducted in October 2025. It also marks a substantial increase from the 874,000 people (17 percent of the analysed population) classified in Phase 3 or above in the period of November 2025 to March 2026. The increase comprises 79,000 additional people classified in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) and around 290,000 additional people in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) This marked increase reveals the scale of the shift: more people are being affected, and those affected are facing more severe levels of acute food insecurity.

The deterioration in the updated projection period is primarily driven by renewed conflict, large-scale displacement, persistent insecurity in conflict-affected governorates, disruption to livelihoods and income opportunities, rising food and fuel prices, and a widening humanitarian assistance gap, particularly from May 2026 onward. The latest assumptions reflect a significantly heightened crisis context than what was occurring in the analysis conducted in October 2025, with renewed hostilities, high and potentially increasing displacement, worsening market functionality in conflict-affected areas, and an expected contraction in GDP in 2026 replacing earlier recovery expectations.

While food remains available nationally and supply chains in safer governorates are expected to continue functioning, localised market disruptions in conflict-affected areas are severe and expected to persist throughout the projection period. The WFP Market Functionality Index (MFI) deteriorated from 7.8 in September 2025 to 5.7 in March 2026, with El Nabatieh and South governorates collapsing to 1.7, reflecting widespread shop closures, severe disruption to deliveries, reduced stock coverage, and sharply constrained physical access to markets.

As of late March 2026, around 1.1 million people are internally displaced, including over 133,000 people residing in collective shelters, while outward cross-border movement continues. Displacement is expected to remain high and potentially increase further through the projection period, placing additional pressure on host communities, already strained rental markets, essential services, and local labour opportunities.

Humanitarian access to conflict-affected areas in Lebanon has been severely constrained since the escalation in hostilities, with significant challenges hindering humanitarian efforts due to the fragile security environment and ongoing clashes. Regions near the blue line and south of the Litani river, as well as south of the Zahrani river, including south and El Nabatieh governorates, are largely inaccessible due to the military operations, the presence of armed groups, and extensive infrastructural damage. Humanitarian access in these areas was further impeded by unexploded ordnance, roadblocks, and security-related restrictions, limiting both the mobility of affected populations and the ability of humanitarian actors to deliver aid effectively. As such, logistical operations were hampered by these factors, requiring coordinated inter-agency convoys to ensure the delivery of critical supplies.

The effects of the 2026 conflict in the Middle East—including higher fuel and transport costs, pressures on import prices and supply routes, higher fertiliser and input prices, and continued disruption to livelihoods—are likely to materialise progressively over the coming months. As such, the full impact of the recent escalation and the broader conflict in the Middle East may not yet be fully reflected in this updated projection, and actual food security outcomes could deteriorate further should hostilities intensify, or regional trade disruptions persist.

Lebanese residents: The deterioration in the food security situation is increasingly affecting Lebanese households at scale. The number of Lebanese residents projected to be in Phase 3 or above increased from 484,000 people (13 percent of the analysed Lebanese population) in the current period (November 2025 - March 2026) to 725,000 people (19 percent of the analysed Lebanese population) in the updated projection period. This includes around 54,000 people in Phase 4, equivalent to around one percent of the analysed Lebanese population, compared with no Lebanese residents classified in Phase 4 in the current period.

The highest proportions of Lebanese residents in Phase 3 or above are in Bent Jbeil & Marjaayoun (65 percent), Sour (55 percent), El Nabatieh (50 percent), Baalbek & El Hermel (35 percent), and Akkar and Saida (30 percent).

Lebanese population classified in Phase 4 are present in areas most severely affected by the conflict or hosting the largest proportion of displaced people, such as Bent Jbeil & Marjaayoun, El Nabatieh, Sour, Saida, Beirut, Hasbaya & Rachaya Baalbek & El Hermel, and West Bekaa. This reflects a significant deterioration in food security conditions affecting the most vulnerable. In absolute terms, the highest number of Lebanese residents facing high levels of acute food insecurity are in Akkar (91,000 people), Beirut (90,000 people), Chouf & Jezzine (78,000 people), Saida (78,000 people), and Baalbek & El Hermel (70,000 people).

Compared with the current period, the largest increases in the proportion of Lebanese residents in Phase 3 or above are in Bent Jbeil & Marjaayoun (45 percentage point increase), Sour (40 percentage point increase), El Nabatieh (35 percentage point increase) and Beirut and Saida (15 percentage point increase each). These sharp increases reflect the direct effect of the conflict escalation on southern districts, alongside displacement pressures, deteriorating access to income, and rising living costs in major hosting areas.

Syrian refugees: Syrian refugees continue to face high levels of acute food insecurity, with the number of people in IPC Phase 3 or above increasing from 277,000 people (28 percent of the analysed Syrian refugee population) in the current period (November 2025-March 2026) to 362,000 people (36 percent of the analysed Syrian refugee population) in the updated projection period. This includes around 26,000 people in Phase 4, equivalent to around three percent of the analysed Syrian refugee population, compared with around 1,300 people in Phase 4 in the current period.

The largest increases in the proportion of Syrian refugees in Phase 3 or above are in Bent Jbeil & Marjaayoun and Sour (40 percentage point increase), El Nabatieh (30 percentage point increase), and Beirut, Hasbaya, and Saida (15 percentage point increase each). This deterioration is closely linked to the anticipated widening humanitarian assistance gap, rising prices, reduced labour opportunities, and continued displacement and movement restrictions.

Palestine Refugees in Lebanon: Palestine refugees are greatly affected by alarming high levels of food insecurity, with the updated projection indicating that 104,000 people (45 percent of the analysed Palestine refugee population) are in Phase 3 or above, up from 69,000 people (30 percent of the analysed Palestine refugee population) in the current period. This includes around 12,000 people in Phase 4, equivalent to 5 percent of the analysed Palestine refugee population.

This represents a 15-percentage point increase and confirms that Palestine refugees remain among the most severely affected groups nationally. The sharp deterioration is particularly concerning given the already high structural vulnerability of this population and the very limited assistance foreseen during the projection period.

Post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria: The Post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria remain among the most severely affected groups in relative terms, with around 50,000 people (52 percent of the analysed population of post 2024 arrivals from Syria) projected to be in Phase 3 or above. This includes around 10,000 people in Phase 4, equivalent to 10 percent of the analysed popluation of post 2024 arrivals from Syria.

The highest prevalence remains in the Baalbek & El Hermel cluster, where around 38,000 people (55 percent of the analysed popluation of post 2024 arrivals from Syria) are in IPC Phase 3 or above, including around 7,000 people in Phase 4. In Akkar and Tripoli, around 7,000 people and 5,000 people respectively are in Phase 3 or above, both representing 45 percent of the analysed population of post 2024 arrivals from Syria in those units.

Compared with the current period, the deterioration among post-2024 arrivals from Syria are concentrated in the Baalbek & El Hermel cluster, where the proportion in Phase 3 or above increases from 45 percent to 55 percent, while Akkar and Tripoli remain at similarly severe levels. This reflects the continued vulnerability of this population, including weak social and economic integration, high dependence on humanitarian assistance, and limited coping capacity.

FOCUS ON HFSA

The deterioration in the food security situation also reflects the expected reduction in HFSA throughout the projection period, especially from June 2026 onwards, across all population groups, at a time when many households are already experiencing mild acute food insecurity, or IPC Phase 2 (Stressed). These people are highly vulnerable and require livelihood support to risk sliding into IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) and IPC Phase 4 (Emergency).

HFSA is expected to remain available only temporarily and well below rising needs, with coverage projected to decline sharply beyond May. Currently, time bound assumptions suggest coverage of approximately 23 percent for Lebanese households, 37 percent for Syrian refugees, 26 percent for Palestine refugees, and 39 percent for post 2024 arrivals. Access to conflict affected areas—particularly in the South and El Nabatieh—remains severely constrained, significantly limiting effective assistance delivery in the areas most affected by the crisis.

This is particularly critical for refugee populations and newly displaced groups, whose food security outcomes remain closely tied to the continuity of assistance, while Lebanese households are increasingly affected by the combined impact of displacement, rising costs, and deteriorating economic access to food.

Elevated conflict intensity and expanded insecurity expected to persist throughout the projection period

Hostilities have escalated and intensified since early March 2026—a situation that is expected to persist through July/August 2026—and expanded geographically, with airstrikes continuing in the south, northern Bekaa, and the southern suburbs of Beirut, alongside the possibility of sporadic strikes in what are deemed to be safer areas. Ground incursions started in March in the southern border areas and are expected to persist, with the risk of moving further north, while the northeastern border area is expected to remain volatile. The escalation has already resulted in more than 2,100 fatalities and thousands of injuries by mid-April 2026. The escalation in hostilities has caused significant damage to civilian infrastructure across southern Lebanon, notably affecting residential buildings, road networks, and other essential infrastructure.

The security outlook assumes that the situation will continue throughout the projection period, with displacement levels expected to persist and potentially increase further by the end of the period. Renewed insecurity is expected to continue constraining mobility, humanitarian access, livelihoods, market recovery, and return options, especially in conflict-affected areas. This is expected to worsen food security outcomes both directly, through income loss and displacement, and indirectly, through disruption to services, markets, and local economies as the conflict drags on.

Prolonged displacement and repeated secondary movements expected to continue

As of late March 2026, over 1.1 million people were internally displaced, with nearly 133,000 people staying in shelters. The projection assumes continued large-scale internal displacement, repeated secondary movements toward more affordable areas, and additional pressure on host communities, services, and housing markets.

Displacement patterns show significant concentration in a limited number of districts, with Beirut hosting the largest number of displaced people (approximately 240,000), representing around one quarter of the total displaced population. Beirut also hosts the highest number of people in collective shelters (approximately 47,000 people), accounting for about one third of all displaced people in shelters. This is followed by Chouf and Aley, hosting approximately 185,000 and 161,000 displaced people respectively. This large-scale displacement is placing substantial pressure on already fragile systems and host communities, with direct implications for food security through increased demand, strained services, and reduced access to livelihoods.

Key Assumptions

Conflict: The assumption in the October 2025 analysis was that hostilities would continue but at a low intensity. Instead, they escalated and intensified. Airstrikes are expected to continue in the south, northern Bekaa, and the southern suburbs of Beirut, with sporadic strikes also possible in what are deemed to be safer areas. Ground incursions in southern border areas are expected to persist and may move further north, while the northeastern border area remains volatile. Full-scale insecurity is expected to continue constraining mobility, humanitarian access, livelihoods, and market recovery.

Displacement: Current displacement levels are expected to remain high and potentially increase further throughout the projection period. Large-scale internal displacement, repeated secondary movements, and continued outward cross-border movement are expected to maintain pressure on host communities, services, shelter options, and labour markets, while limiting safe and voluntary returns.

Economic growth: Earlier expectations of gradual recovery have been replaced by an expected GDP contraction in 2026, driven by lower tourism, weaker remittances, higher uncertainty, market disruption in conflict-affected areas, and large-scale displacement of labour. Economic activity is expected to weaken across services, commerce, tourism, and agriculture, with negative spillovers even in safer governorates.

Exchange rate: The Lebanese pound is expected to remain relatively stable in the short term, but only through continued Central Bank intervention and reserve use. Exchange-rate stability is no longer expected to be sufficient to contain inflationary pressure, particularly as foreign currency inflows weaken and conflict-related pressures persist.

Inflation: Inflation is expected to persist at elevated levels throughout the projection period, with food prices projected to rise by 10 to 12 percent and additional pressure expected on transport, housing, cooking gas, and essential services. March 2026 already showed a strong upward shift, with the full SMEB increasing by six percent in one month, reversing the earlier trend of relative easing.

HFSA: HFSA is expected to remain temporarily available but well below rising needs, with coverage likely to decline sharply beyond May. Temporary assumptions indicate around 23 percent coverage for Lebanese households, 37 percent for Syrian refugees, 26 percent for Palestine refugees and 39 percent for post-2024 arrivals. Access to conflict-affected areas, particularly in the south and El Nabatieh, remains severely constrained, limiting effective delivery in the most affected locations.

Access constraints are expected to remain concentrated in conflict-affected areas and areas under evacuation orders. At the same time, post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria are expected to continue facing restricted access to shelter, services, and livelihoods, while also contributing to growing pressure on already overstretched hosting areas.

Economic recovery expectations replaced by contraction in 2026

Earlier expectations of fragile recovery have been replaced by an assumption of GDP contraction in 2026, driven by lower tourism and remittances, higher uncertainty, market disruption in conflict-affected areas, and the massive displacement of labour. The conflict escalation is expected to disrupt recovering sectors such as tourism, retail, services, commerce, and agriculture, while physical damage and economic losses are assumed to be similar in scale to the late-2024 conflict escalation. Even in safer governorates, job-intensive sectors are expected to be negatively affected, reducing income opportunities and weakening household purchasing power.

Income opportunities expected to deteriorate across vulnerable groups

Income and employment conditions are expected to worsen during the projection period. Households dependent on tourism, retail, agriculture, informal labour, and daily wage work are expected to be particularly affected. Displacement is assumed to disrupt jobs, productive assets, and access to agricultural land in conflict-affected areas, while increasing labour market pressure in hosting areas. Special Central Bank circulars and public wage payments in USD are assumed to continue, preserving some purchasing power for certain households, but not enough to offset the effect of rising inflation and worsening affordability.

Exchange rate stability expected to hold only through continued intervention

The exchange rate is expected to remain broadly stable in the short term, but only through continued Central Bank intervention. Unlike the previous round, exchange rate stability is no longer assumed to be sufficient to contain inflationary pressure. As conflict drags on, the Central Bank is expected to face a growing trade-off between preserving exchange-rate stability and protecting foreign reserve buffers. Lower tourism inflows and regional conflict are also expected to increase pressure on foreign currency availability and remittance inflows, especially from Gulf countries.

Key Assumptions (Continued)

Tensions: Social and community tensions are expected to persist and gradually intensify, driven by conflict, displacement, inflation, political polarisation, and pressure on shelter, jobs, and services. Non-Lebanese populations are expected to face more constrained access to shelter and assistance, while repeated secondary movements may further undermine coping capacity.

Political developments: The current political configuration is expected to remain in place throughout the projection period, but reform momentum is likely to slow further. The postponement of parliamentary elections by two years is expected to shift attention away from reform toward crisis management, while state institutions remain operational, but resource constrained. At the same time, access to conflict-affected areas—particularly in the South and Nabatieh, is expected to remain severely constrained, limiting the effective delivery of assistance in the most affected areas.

Market functionality: Markets are expected to remain functional in safer governorates but severely disrupted in conflict-affected areas. The national MFI declined from 7.8 to 5.7 between September 2025 and March 2026, with the sharpest deterioration recorded in El Nabatieh and the south governorates, while Beirut and much of Mount Lebanon remain highly functional.

Agriculture: Agriculture is expected to sustain significant production losses during the projection period. Renewed hostilities, damaged productive assets, displacement, and restricted access to agricultural land and irrigation water, and disrupted roads and markets—compounded by rising fuel, transport, and agricultural inputs costs—will constrain production and marketing, erode rural livelihoods, and exert upward pressure on prices of domestically produced agrifood products.

Domestic food supply: Domestic food supply is expected to remain broadly adequate at national level, supported by continued imports, functioning supply chains in safer areas, and short-term wheat and flour stocks. However, localised access and availability challenges are expected in conflict-affected areas due to blocked roads, delivery interruptions, shop closures, and rapid stock depletion. The main national risk remains affordability rather than an overall shortage of food.

Inflation expected to persist and accelerate, driven by fuel, food, and services

The assumption of subdued inflation has been replaced by a scenario of persistently higher inflation throughout the projection period. Food prices are expected to rise by 10 to 12 percent, while non-food items and services are expected to face additional pressure from rising fuel costs, new taxes and tariffs, and broader regional trade disruption. March 2026 already showed a strong upward shift in prices, with the food SMEB increasing by 6 percent in one month, the food MEB increasing by 9 percent, the first increase in Arabic bread prices since September 2024, which brought the price of the bread bundle up by 17 percent throughout the month of March 2026, and rising costs observed across food, transport, cooking gas, rent, and essential services. Combustible fuel as well has registered significant increase, with the cost of diesel having increased by 83 percent by mid-April 2026 compared to the mid-February 2026, while that of gasoline and of cooking gas increased by 41 percent and 27 percent respectively. This combination of higher global and domestic fuel prices, fiscal measures, and conflict-related disruption is expected to continue eroding household purchasing power.

Markets expected to remain supplied nationally, but with severe localised disruptions

The March 2026 WFP Market Functionality Index (MFI) showed that market functionality deteriorated significantly at national level, with the score falling from 7.8 in September 2025 to 5.7 in March 2026. The most severe disruptions were recorded in El Nabatieh and the south, where the MFI collapsed from 7.3 to 1.7, effectively reversing the recovery observed after late 2024. These areas recorded the lowest possible scores in availability, price, and supply resilience, reflecting widespread shop closures, severe delivery disruptions, reduced stock coverage, and sharply constrained physical access to markets.

By contrast, markets in safer governorates are expected to remain functional, with Beirut recording an MFI of 10 and Mount Lebanon outside the southern suburbs also showing maximum functionality in March 2026. However, even in those areas, the outlook points to increasing price pressures and affordability constraints, as hosting areas absorb additional displaced populations and face rising transport, fuel, and operating costs. The main impact in safer areas is therefore expected to come less from physical shortages and more from reduced affordability and pressure on household purchasing power.

Disruption in conflict-affected areas is expected to persist as long as hostilities continue. MFI findings show that over 80 percent of markets in El Nabatieh and around two-thirds in the south were non-functional, while access constraints were overwhelmingly conflict-related and particularly severe in El Nabatieh (96 percent of markets reporting access constraints), the southern suburbs of Beirut (74 percent), and the south (60 percent). Stock coverage also deteriorated sharply in active conflict zones, with 87 percent of markets in El Nabatieh, 75 percent in the south, and 63 percent in the southern suburbs holding less than one week of essential food stocks.

At the same time, national food flows are expected to continue, and no immediate nationwide shortages in essential commodities are assumed. Food imports remain the backbone of domestic food availability, import flows are still functioning, wheat and flour stocks are considered adequate in the short term, and official reporting continues to indicate that food products are arriving daily by sea. The main national market risk therefore remains affordability rather than physical availability, although localised access disruption is likely to persist in hard-to-reach areas, areas under evacuation orders, and markets directly affected by conflict.

Agriculture expected to face further severe losses

Agriculture is expected to deteriorate further during the projection period, with the sector still recovering from the impacts of the 2024 conflict. Renewed hostilities have already impacted and are expected to further disrupt a critical planting and harvesting period, particularly in conflict-affected areas where approximately one quarter of agricultural land is already affected. Ongoing displacement, insecurity, disrupted roads and markets, restricted access to agricultural land and irrigation water, and damaged productive assets—combined with elevated fuel, transport, and agricultural input costs—are expected to limit planting and harvesting activities and disrupt local market functioning. As a result, agricultural output is projected to decline further, reducing the availability of domestically produced fresh agrifood products and increasing reliance on imports. These constraints are also expected to erode rural incomes and exert upward pressure on prices of locally produced vegetables and fruits. Livestock and poultry systems remain under additional strain due to restricted access to grazing areas, feed shortages, and disrupted veterinary services. With the spring planting window closing, the risk of missed production cycles is increasing, which is likely to translate into further production losses and heightened food insecurity in the months ahead without timely support.

Domestic food supply expected to remain adequate nationally, despite higher costs and localised access issues

Domestic food supply is expected to remain broadly adequate at national levels during the projection period, supported by continued food imports, functioning supply chains in safer areas, and short-term stock coverage for essential commodities, including wheat and flour. Import flows are expected to continue, port operations are assumed to remain functional, and official reporting indicates that food products continue to arrive daily by sea. Wheat and flour availability are considered sufficient in the short term, with mill stocks estimated to cover roughly two to three months of national consumption.

At the same time, localised availability and access challenges are expected to persist in conflict-affected areas due to blocked roads, delivery interruptions, shop closures, rapid stock depletion, and evacuation-related restrictions. These disruptions are not expected to translate into immediate nationwide shortages, but they are likely to weaken physical access to food in hard-to-reach and highly affected locations, especially in areas directly exposed to hostilities. The main national food supply risk is therefore not an overall lack of food commodities, but rather the combination of localised access disruption, rising import and logistics costs, and increasing pressure on affordability. In addition, the continued absence of a strategic grain reserve remains a structural weakness, leaving the system exposed to further shocks should hostilities intensify or regional trade routes face prolonged disruption.

Limited political progress and reform momentum expected to stall

The current political configuration and government are expected to remain in place throughout the projection period, but reform momentum is assumed to slow further. The postponement of parliamentary elections by two years in March 2026 is assumed to shift political attention away from reform and toward crisis management. State institutions are expected to remain operational and somewhat more capable than during the 2024 escalation, but still constrained by limited resources. Meaningful reforms or public measures that could improve the macroeconomic context, strengthen recovery, or significantly improve public service delivery are considered unlikely during the outlook period.

Social tensions and access constraints expected to intensify gradually

Social tensions are expected to persist and gradually intensify throughout the projection period, although large-scale incidents are not assumed. Tensions between host communities, refugees, and IDPs are expected to rise due to continued displacement, inflation, restricted shelter options, competition over jobs and services, and political polarisation. Non-Lebanese populations are expected to face more constrained access to shelter, assistance, and local services, while repeated secondary movements to more affordable locations are likely to further disrupt coping strategies and increase vulnerability.

HFSA expected to decline sharply throughout the projection period relative to needs

HFSA is expected to remain temporarily available in the short term, but well below rising needs and likely to decline sharply beyond May. The updated assumptions reflect limited temporary coverage of around 23 percent for Lebanese households, 37 percent for Syrian refugees and 39 percent for post-2024 arrivals. Assistance is assumed to cover around 45 percent of kilocalorie needs for Lebanese and Syrian refugees.

At the same time, humanitarian access to conflict-affected areas, particularly in the south and El Nabatieh governorates, remains severely constrained due to insecurity, movement restrictions, and infrastructural damage, further limiting the effective delivery of assistance in areas already facing significant market functionality challenges.

Coverage for Syrian refugees is expected to drop from expanded short-term levels of around 60 percent to approximately 15 percent starting June, while Lebanese support through hot meals and the SRSN is currently projected to last only until May. The provision of one meal per day per person in collective shelters, which has supported displaced populations since the escalation, is also not expected to continue beyond May, further increasing the risk of deterioration among displaced households. These reductions come at a time when many households in Phase 2 remain highly vulnerable and risk deteriorating into higher phases.

For Palestine refugees, assistance is assumed to cover around 21 percent of the kilocaloric needs for Palestinian refugees from Lebanon (PRL) and around 26 percent of the kilocaloric needs for Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS). In addition, coverage for the Palestinian refugee population in the projection period is expected to stand at around 19 percent of the PRL population and a 100 percent of the PRS population. However, the PRS populations constitute only around 9 percent of the total number of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, leaving the overall group highly vulnerable and exposed to high levels of acute food insecurity.

IPC trends

Lebanon's successive IPC analyses since late 2022 show a prolonged period of elevated food insecurity, marked by temporary improvements followed by repeated reversals linked to conflict escalation, assistance cuts, and macroeconomic pressure. Following the relative easing observed through 2025, the latest projection update confirms that this recovery has now been sharply reversed. Between April and August 2026, around 1.24 million people (24 percent of the analysed population) are facing Phase 3 or above, including around 101,000 people in Phase 4. This is a marked deterioration compared with the current period of November 2025 to March 2026, when around 874,000 people (17 percent) were classified in Phase 3 or above, including around 22,000 people in Phase 4.

Looking back further, the analysis conducted in October 2025 had already documented a sharp improvement from the late-2024 conflict peak, when around 1.6 million people were estimated to be in Phase 3 or above following the most intense period of conflict-related disruption. It also recorded a decline from around 1.17 million people (21 percent) in the period of April–June 2025, showing that by late 2025, food insecurity had fallen to its lowest level since IPC was introduced in Lebanon. The current projection update reverses much of that progress, bringing the projected caseload back to the levels observed during the April–September 2024 projection update, when around 1.26 million people (23 percent) were expected to be in Phase 3 or above.

The overall trend therefore points not to a sustained recovery, but to a highly shock-sensitive food security situation in which gains remain fragile and can be rapidly reversed by renewed conflict, displacement, inflationary pressure, and cuts in humanitarian assistance. The March 2026 escalation has interrupted the fragile improvement observed after the November 2024 ceasefire, with food insecurity now increasing again across all population groups. The deterioration in the updated projection period is worse than previously anticipated, and is particularly severe given the simultaneous rise of people in Phase 4 and the expectation that the full impact of the escalation and wider conflict in the Middle East may not yet be fully reflected.

Overall, the trend since late 2024 illustrates three distinct phases: a conflict peak and severe deterioration, followed by a temporary easing during the ceasefire and partial recovery period, and now a renewed sharp worsening under the projection update. This confirms that food insecurity in Lebanon remains structurally high and highly dependent on security conditions, affordability, and the continuity of humanitarian support.

Figure 1: IPC Phase 3 or above (Crisis or Worse) trends from 2023-2026 for each population group











RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

Response priorities

Lifesaving and HFSA: Sustained and adequately funded humanitarian food security assistance remains the most immediate priority to prevent a further deterioration in food security outcomes during the projection period. Particular attention should be given to the population groups and geographic areas facing the highest severity, especially conflict-affected southern districts, highly vulnerable hosting areas, Syrian refugees, Palestine refugees, and post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria. Ensuring continued, sustained, and safe humanitarian access to the most affected areas is critical to enable effective delivery of assistance where needs are highest. In view of the projected rise of people in Phase 4, urgent efforts are needed to secure additional funding, maintain continuity of assistance beyond June 2026, and avoid further reductions in coverage and transfer adequacy. Continued support to households currently in Phase 2 is also essential to prevent people sliding into Phase 3.

Social protection and nationally led response mechanisms: Given the scale of deterioration among Lebanese households, continued support to social protection responses and nationally led mechanisms remains important. Efforts to sustain and strengthen existing systems, such as AMAN, and including those that can support rapid emergency response, such as the Shock Responsive Safety Nets (SRSN), should continue where feasible, in parallel with humanitarian assistance. This is particularly important in a context of rising needs, limited household coping capacity, and declining humanitarian resources.

Market support and affordability monitoring: Continued monitoring of market functionality, food prices, fuel costs, bread prices, transport costs, and supply chain performance remains essential to guide response adjustments. In conflict-affected and hosting areas, interventions that help maintain market access and reduce affordability constraints should be prioritised wherever operationally feasible.

Agricultural support and recovery: Agricultural households in conflict-affected areas require urgent support to prevent further losses in production and income. Priority interventions should include access to seeds, fertilisers, pesticides, irrigation support, feed, veterinary inputs, and cash-based support for agricultural production where feasible. Support to small-scale farmers and livestock keepers is especially important in southern Lebanon, El Nabatieh, Baalbek-El Hermel, Bekaa, Akkar, and other affected rural areas, where conflict and high production costs continue to undermine livelihoods and local food supply.

Livelihood assistance: Protecting and restoring livelihoods is critical given the role of income loss, displacement, and rising living costs in driving the projected deterioration. Support should prioritise households dependent on informal labour, agriculture, daily wage work, retail, and service-sector activities, especially in conflict-affected and hosting areas. Livelihood interventions should aim to protect household purchasing power, reduce negative coping, and help vulnerable households meet their food and essential needs without further depleting their limited assets.

Education and school feeding programs: Scaling up school feeding programs targeting displaced and host community children in priority districts, linking school feeding to local food production, and integrating nutrition and psychosocial services into education responses will help mitigate negative coping strategies such as child labour and school dropout.

Integrate nutrition sensitive activities: Embedding nutrition-sensitive interventions across food security and humanitarian efforts is necessary to improve dietary diversity and nutritional outcomes. This includes promoting community education, ensuring access to fortified foods, and strengthening collaboration between agriculture, health, and social protection systems.

Situation Monitoring and Update

Given the speed and scale of the recent escalation, continuous monitoring remains essential throughout the projection period. This projection update was conducted shortly after a major deterioration in the security context, and the full effects of the escalation may not yet be fully reflected in the available evidence. The broader impacts of prolonged displacement, higher fuel and transport costs, inflationary pressure, reduced income opportunities, and continued disruption to livelihoods are likely to materialise progressively over the coming months. As such, regular monitoring of food security conditions and contributing factors remains critical to ensure timely response adjustments and to inform any further analytical updates.

Risk factors to monitor

- **Conflict and security situation:** The most important risk factor remains a further deterioration in the security situation, including more frequent strikes in areas currently deemed to be safe, wider geographic expansion of hostilities, deeper ground incursions, and broader damage to civilian infrastructure. Any such escalation would likely result in additional displacement, further disruption to markets and livelihoods, reduced humanitarian access, and a worsening of food security outcomes beyond the current projection.

- Displacement and worsening access constraints: If displacement remains protracted or increases beyond current assumptions, additional pressure on host communities, shelters, rental markets, essential services, and labour markets is likely. Repeated secondary movements and reduced access to shelter, employment, and assistance, particularly for refugees and other non-Lebanese groups, could further weaken coping capacity and accelerate deterioration among already vulnerable households.
- Middle East conflict spillover and rising costs: The 2026 conflict in the Middle East remains a major risk, particularly through its effect on fuel prices, shipping and insurance costs, import prices, remittance flows, and tourism. Continued disruption to regional trade routes or prolonged closure of critical maritime corridors could further increase inflationary pressure and reduce household purchasing power. The full impact of these spillover effects may not yet be fully reflected in the current projection and could worsen market conditions and food access over time.
- Exchange rate and inflationary pressures: Although exchange rate stability is expected to continue in the short term, this remains dependent on continued Central Bank intervention and reserve use. Any additional pressure on reserves, reduced foreign currency inflows, or weakening of monetary control could lead to renewed exchange-rate instability, further accelerating food and non-food inflation and worsening affordability for vulnerable households.
- Humanitarian and social assistance: Another critical risk is a sharper than assumed decline in humanitarian food security assistance. If additional resources are not mobilised, assistance coverage may fall below already reduced planning assumptions, especially for Syrian refugees, Palestine refugees, and vulnerable Lebanese households. This would increase the likelihood of a larger number of households in Phase 2 sliding into Phase 3 or above.
- Localised market isolation and prolonged non-functionality: Markets in conflict-affected areas may remain non-functional for longer than currently assumed, especially if insecurity continues to disrupt trader access, deliveries, and stock replenishment. Prolonged isolation of local markets, combined with reduced access to food and essential goods, could further worsen conditions in high-severity areas and reduce the feasibility of market-based responses.
- Nutrition: Malnutrition monitoring is also necessary, especially with the marked disparities across geographical areas and population groups. As such, continuous monitoring is essential for early and timely identification of relevant interventions.

PROCESS AND METHODOLOGY

The IPC Acute Food Insecurity projection update was conducted for one period: April to August 2026. The analysis covered four population groups: Lebanese residents, Syrian refugees displaced before December 2024, Palestine refugees, and post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria. The analysis covered approximately 99 percent of the total population living in Lebanon and was conducted across a total of 48 units of analysis: 19 units for Lebanese residents, 25 for Syrian refugees, one national unit for Palestine refugees, and three units for post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria..

The analysis was held online between 30 March and 3 April 2026, with support provided by the IPC Global Support Unit (GSU) virtually. The workshop was conducted under the leadership of the Ministry of Agriculture and was attended by 45 experts including Technical Working Group members and analysts from UN organisations, local and international NGOs, technical agencies, academia, and governmental institutions. Most members of this round of analysis and facilitators have local expertise which better supported in understanding the overall context to ensure an accurate reflection of food insecurity needs in Lebanon.

The projection update relied on the convergence of available evidence on both food security outcomes and contributing factors. Outcome data included mVAM 2025–2026 and the UNRWA High Frequency Survey 2026. Additional evidence on contributing factors included WFP Market Monitor data, WFP Market Functionality Index (MFI) findings, WFP Rapid Situation Monitoring (RSM), ACLED conflict data, DRM shelter data, World Bank damage and macroeconomic data, FAO damage and loss information, the Ministry of Agriculture Response Plan to support the Agriculture Sector, IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix data, OXFAM Nationwide Vulnerability Assessment, and ACF Multi-Sector Needs Assessment with Post-December 24 arrivals in North and Akkar. Additionally, Humanitarian Food Assistance data was provided by the Food Security and Agriculture sector with the support of all reporting partners.

The analysis was conducted as a projection update rather than a full new current-and-projected IPC round. It was triggered by the major contextual deterioration that took place following the renewed escalation in hostilities in early March 2026, which significantly changed the assumptions underpinning the previous projection period in the November 2025 report. The update therefore focused on revising the most likely scenario for April–August 2026 based on the latest available information on conflict intensity, displacement, humanitarian assistance, prices, livelihoods, market functionality, and regional spillover risks.

Given the recency of the conflict escalation, the TWG considered that the full effects of the escalation and wider conflict in the Middle East may not yet be fully reflected in currently available evidence. As such, the analysis incorporated what was known at the time regarding displacement, insecurity, humanitarian assistance assumptions, price trends, market conditions, and regional spillover effects, while recognising that actual outcomes could deteriorate further should these pressures intensify or persist for longer than currently assumed.

HFSA was incorporated into the analysis in line with IPC protocols, as an important mitigating factor affecting food security outcomes. As in previous rounds, only assistance that directly contributes to reducing food consumption gaps and protecting livelihoods was considered. The analysis assessed both the current and expected coverage of assistance and its role in preventing a further deterioration in food security outcomes, while recognizing the major uncertainty surrounding funding continuity beyond May–June 2026.

The evidence levels of the analysis are medium (**). The analysis was conducted using the IPC Analysis Platform (AP).

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Limitations of the Analysis

The IPC analysis for this round faced several limitations including:

Evolving population figures and displacement dynamics: The fluidity of population movements, especially within Lebanon, complicated the analysis. Discrepancies in population estimates, coupled with the absence of updated official figures, necessitated reliance on the population numbers endorsed by the LRP and inter-agency coordination systems and their update based on the latest available displacement data. This decision, while pragmatic, underscores the inherent uncertainty in displacement and population data during such a volatile period, particularly considering large-scale internal displacement, outward cross-border movement, and the limited availability of nationality disaggregated displacement information.

Data gaps in specific districts and population groups: Given that this was a projection update, the clustering approach adopted in the previous analyses for districts that did not meet minimum sample size requirements was maintained. While methodologically consistent, this limits the ability to capture intra-governorate disparities and localised shocks, particularly in areas experiencing significantly different conflict impacts and vulnerability profiles. For example, the southern suburbs of Beirut, analysed within the Baabda district, face markedly different levels of conflict exposure, displacement, and market disruption compared to other parts of the district. The inability to isolate such hotspots may mask localised severity. Strengthening data collection and analytical granularity in future rounds, such as was done in this round when analysing the market functionality index assessment data, and including the identification of key hotspots during the preparation phase, would help better capture acute, localised deterioration in food security conditions.

HFSA funding volatility and programmatic uncertainty: The planning and assumptions underpinning the provision of HFSA were challenged by limited visibility on confirmed funding flows and implementation plans across key population groups. Recurrent adjustments from the donor side, combined with shifting programmatic priorities and expected reductions in coverage, created difficulty in establishing stable assistance assumptions for the full projection period. These changes required repeated coordination with operational agencies to validate expected coverage, continuity, and related assumptions.

Rapidly evolving conflict context and recency of escalation: This projection update was conducted shortly after a major deterioration in the security context, and the full effects of the recent conflict escalation may not yet be fully reflected in the available evidence. The broader impacts of conflict escalation, prolonged displacement, higher fuel and transport costs, inflationary pressure, and continued disruption to livelihoods are likely to materialise progressively over the coming months. As such, actual food security outcomes may differ should conditions deteriorate further beyond the assumptions used at the time of analysis.

Despite these limitations, the IPC TWG employed rigorous protocols and methodologies to ensure the reliability and relevance of the analysis. Continuous monitoring and future IPC analyses will be critical in addressing these gaps and refining the understanding of food security dynamics in Lebanon.

What is the IPC and IPC Acute Food Insecurity?

The IPC is a set of tools and procedures to classify the severity and characteristics of food and nutrition crises based on international standards. The IPC consists of four mutually reinforcing functions, each with a set of specific protocols (tools and procedures). The core IPC parameters include consensus building, convergence of evidence, accountability, transparency and comparability. The IPC analysis aims at informing emergency response as well as medium and long-term food security policy and programming.

For the IPC, Acute Food Insecurity is defined as any manifestation of food insecurity found in a specified area at a specific point in time of a severity that threatens lives or livelihoods, or both, regardless of the causes, context or duration. It is highly susceptible to change and can occur and manifest in a population within a short amount of time, as a result of sudden changes or shocks that negatively impact on the determinants of food insecurity.

Acute Food Insecurity Phase name and description

Phase 1 None/Minimal	Phase 2 Stressed	Phase 3 Crisis	Phase 4 Emergency	Phase 5 Catastrophe/ Famine
Households are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical and unsustainable strategies to access food and income.	Households have minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in stress-coping strategies.	Households either: • have food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above-usual acute malnutrition; or • are marginally able to meet minimum food needs but only by depleting essential livelihood assets or through crisis-coping strategies.	Households either: • have large food consumption gaps that are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality; **or** • are able to mitigate large food consumption gaps but only by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation	Households have an extreme lack of food and/or cannot meet other basic needs, even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels are evident. For famine classification, area needs to have extreme critical levels of acute malnutrition and mortality.)

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Classification of food insecurity and malnutrition was conducted using the IPC protocols, which are developed and implemented worldwide by the IPC Global Partnership - Action Against Hunger, CARE, CILSS, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), EC-JRC, FAO, FEWS NET, Global Food Security Cluster, Global Nutrition Cluster, IFPRI, IGAD, IMPACT Initiatives, Oxfam, SICA, SADC, Save the Children, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, WHO and the World Bank.

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